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In. the former article,
1 we discussed the practice in new trials at
the common law in England, and pointed out that the trial courts
were inferior courts whose judges derived their authority from royal
commissions and that they had no power to grant a new trial.
In the present article it is proposed to discuss the practice in new
trials as it at present exists on both sides of the Atlantic in the English-




The greatest change in English courts was effected by The Supreme
Court of Judicature Act of i873. This far-reaching act united and
consolidated all the superior courts of England into "one Supreme
Court of Judicature in England" (sec. 3). This supreme court was
to consist of two permanent divisions, one of which, "Her Majesty's
High Court of Justice," was to have original jurisdiction with certain
appellate jurisdiction from inferior courts; the other, "Her Majesty's
Court of Appeal," appellate jurisdiction with certain original juris-
diction (sec. 4). The High Court was vested (inter alia) with all
the jurisdiction which was or could be exercised by "the courts created
by Commissions of Assize,
4 of Oyer and Terminer and of Gaol
Delivery, or any of such commissions" (sec. i6 [eleven]).
But this did not abolish the Court of Commissioners. Commissions
still continue to be issued (sec. 29), and the only change that was
'New Trial at the Common Law (November, 1g16) 26 YAm LAw JOURNAL 49.
' This will exclude from consideration Quebec and Louisiana, etc., as well as
Scotland and some of the small British Isles.
'36 & 37 Vic. Ch. 66. Sec. 2 of this act providing that (with a few exceptions)
the act should come into operation on November 2d, 1874, was repealed by the
act of 1874, 37 & 38 Vic. Ch. 83, which by sec. 2 directed that the act of 1873
should come into force on November Ist, 1875.
"We have seen (26 YA.E LAw JOURNAL 49, 5) that at the common law, the
commissioners usually had five commissions: i. Assize. 2. Nisi Prius. 3. Oyer
and Terminer. 4. General Gaol Delivery, and 5. The Peace. The commission
of Assize was directed to the judges and the clerk of assize to take assizes and
do right upon writs of assize brought before them by such as were wrongfully
thrust out of their possessions; these writs and the original and substituted
practice on them are explained in 3 Bl. Comm. 184 et seq. When ejectment
took the place of these writs, reducing such actions to trial at Nisi Prius, the
commission of Assize became obsolete and the only civil commission issued was
(properly speaking) that of Nisi Prius: nevertheless the term "Assizes" was
retained and the commission was called a "commission of Assize."
[353]
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made was by making the Court of Commissioners part of the High
Court; certiorari did not lie to it, but when it was desired to bring
up a record in a criminal case, an order was made to bring the record
from one part of the High Court, the Court of the Commissioners, to
another, e. g., the Queen's Bench Division.5 No additional powers
were given to the trial judge; applications for a new trial must still
be made to the "court above." Of the five divisions into which the
High Court was divided, three were common-law divisions: the
Queen's Bench, the Common Pleas and the Exchequer Divisions-in
all cases in any of these divisions, whether the case was tried with or
without a jury, an application for a new trial was made to the divi-
sional court "in term" for an order to show cause why a new trial
should not be directed, quite the same as the rule nisi in the former
practice ;7 an appeal lay to the Court of Appeal. In 1876 a rule of
court directed the application to be made to the Court of Appeal if
the case was tried without a jury.
When the common-law divisions were consolidated into one, the
Queen's Bench Division, in i88o,8 the new rules substituted a simple
notice of motion for an order nisi and changed the form in some
instances-where the trial was by a judge without a jury, the applica-
tion must be by appeal to the Court of Appeal, where with a jury in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division to a divisional court of
that division and in every other case to a divisional court of the
Queen's Bench Division.9 Moreover, it was expressly provided that
"no judge shall sit on the hearing of any motion for a new trial in
any cause or matter tried with a jury before himself." 10 The Act of
189611 directs that all motions for a new trial are to be made to the
Court of Appeal "in any cause or matter in the High Court in which
there has been a trial thereof, or of any issue therein with a jury."
The effect of this enactment is to eliminate the divisional court ;12
See, per Lord Coleridge, C. J., in Queen v. Dudley and Stephens (i884)
L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 273, 280.
a We shall see that from 1883, the right of a trial judge to take part in the
hearing of an. application for a new trial in a case tried before him was taken
away.
"In the Chancery Division, whose judges had not a Nisi Prius commission,
the application for a "rehearing" was to the judge: the judge before whom the
action was pending could order a new trial of an issue directed by himself.
In the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, the application was to the
judge who tried the case.
"By Order in Council, December i6th, i88o, authorized by the Act of 1873,
sec. 32; this may be seen in Wilson, Judicature Acts (5th ed. London, i886)
45-48.
'Rules of 1883. Order XXXIX, r. i (R. 55').
"Idem. Order XXXIX, r. 2 (R. 552).
Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 189o, 53 & 54 Vic. Ch. 44, sec. I.
'The language of Lord Justice Kay in Allcock v. Hall (C. A.) [i89r] i Q. B.
444, 449. The present rule governing applications for new trials is Order
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applications in cases tried without a jury still go to the Court of
Appeal.
IN ENGLAND-CRIMINAL CASES
We have seen that at the common law there was no power in any
court t6 grant a new trial in cases of felony, and that while power
was considered to exist in the Court of King's Bench to grant a new
trial in cases of misdemeanor, the power was sparingly exercised,--
never when there was an acquittal except in certain quasi-civil cases,
e. g., in Quo Warranto.3 In the previous article, no account was
taken of the venire facias de novo juratores, which was not technically
an order for a new trial, but which had substantially the same effect-
this was awarded by the court (not the trial judge) where a jury was
discharged without verdict, where a special verdict was insufficient
and in a court of error in cases of mistrial or imperfect verdict.
None of these powers was affected in any way by the various judi-
cature acts, but in 1907 a very great change was effected by the
Criminal Appeal Act of 19o7.14 This act abolished writs of errors and
all the jurisdiction and practice of the King's Bench Division (which
had, under the judicature acts, succeeded to the position of the former
Court of King's Bench) as to the grant of new trials in criminal
cases, and substituted an appeal against a conviction to a Court of
Criminal Appeal on questions of law or (by leave) on questions of
fact, or of mixed law and fact, or as to the legality or propriety of
the sentence imposed. But no power was given to grant a new trial;
and however regrettable the result-an appeal succeeding even on the
ground of misdirection to the jury-the conviction is quashed and the
accused goes free. 5
In the British Colonies the course of amendment has been not dis-
similar to that of England-I trace that in Ontario (Upper Canada)
only.
XXXIX, r. ( CR. S. C. August, 1913)-all applications must be made to the
Court of Appeal whether the case is tried with or without a jury.
'1326 YAum LAW JouNAL 49, 58.
" (1907) 7 Edw. VII, Ch. 23.
'In Rex v. Dyson (Ct. Cr. App.) [i9o8] 2 K. B. 454, 458, Lord Alverstone,
C. J., said:
"It is to be regretted the Legislature when passing the Criminal Appeal Act
did not empower the Court to order a new trial, for the present is a case 
in
which it is eminently desirable that such a power should exist. But they did
not think fit to do so, and we have no choice but to allow the appeal."
This was a case of misdirection as was the later case of Rex v. Ahlers (1914)
24 Cox. C. C. 623, where a German-born British subject escaped the punishment
of high treason.
I have not said anything of the practice under The Crown Cases Act of 1848,
II & 12 Vic. Ch. 78, still in force in Ireland, never in force in Scotland, and
repealed as to England by the Criminal Appeal Act of i9o7. That act authorized
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IN UPPER CANADA (ONTARIO)-CIvIL -CASES
Upper Canada in 179:2 began its provincial career with its immense
territory divided into four districts. In each of these districts there
was a Court of Common Pleas with full civil but no criminal juris-
diction. This condition lasted but a short time; hut while it lasted,
applications for a new trial were made to the judges of the Court
of Common Pleas of the district. These judges presided at the trial
of actions by virtue of their office and did not have commissions of
Assize, etc. The law administered was Canadian, i. e., French-Cana-
dian, although trial by jury was allowed."" In 1794 these four Courts
of Common Pleas were abolished and a Court of King's Bench
created'V with the same jurisdiction, civil and criminal, as the Courts
of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer (on the common-law
side) in England. This Court of King's Bench has been continued
into and is now (with other courts consolidated with it) the Supreme
Court of Ontario..
With the institution of the Court of King's Bench, the English sys-
tem of Nisi Prius and Assize Courts was introduced. Before this
time, as the Courts of Common Pleas had no criminal jurisdiction,
commissions of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery had
been issued for each district, 8 and this practice continued after the
Act of 1794.
The act provided that commissions of Assize and Nisi Prius should
be issued into each district once or twice yearly as was thought proper
for the trial of issues in vacation between terms; and power was given
to issue special commissions to try special offenders, i. e., special
commissions of Oyer and Terminer.
the trial judge in case of a conviction for crime to reserve any question of law
which might have arisen on the trial for the consideration of the justices of
either bench or the barons of the Exchequer. These, a Court for Crown Cases
Reserved, had large powers but not the power to grant a new trial.
"A full description pf these curious courts will be found in a series of
articles, The Early Courts of the Province (1915) 35 CAN. LAW Timms, a paper
read before the Royal Society of Canada, May 28th, 1913, Practice of Court of
Common Pleas of the District of Hesse, 7 TRANSACTIONs R. S. CAN. (3d Ser.
1913) 43 et seq., and an Address before the Michigan Bar Association, June,
1915, The First Judge at Detroit and his Court-all by myself.
'By 34 Geo. IIn, Ch. 2 (U. C.).
1 For example, the first chief justice of Upper Canada, William Osgoode, never
sat in the Court of King's Bench, as he had left the province to become chief
justice of Lower Canada before the Court of King's Bench in Upper Canada
-had been organized; but he sat several times in criminal courts under com-
missions of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery. So, too, William
Dummer Powell, afterwards chief justice of Upper Canada, when he was still
first judge at Detroit (then British) in the Court of Common Pleas for the
district of Hesse (afterwards the Western District) is known to have sat at
criminal courts under such commissions (I have a photostat copy of one before
me as I write).
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It was not until 1855 ' 9 that commissions of Assize and Nisi Prius,
Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery were rendered unneces-
sary, Parliament providing that such courts should be held at such
times as the judges of the courts of common law (by this time a
Court of Common Pleas had been formed" with the same powers as
the Court of Queen's Bench) should appoint. The judges of the courts
of common law were to sit in these courts of Assize and Nisi Prius,
Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery with the same powers
as though they had commissions as formerly.
By the Common Law Procedure Act of 185621 the times of the
sittings of these trial courts were to be fixed by the judges, and the
judges might sit with or without commissions as the Governor (i. e.,
the Ministry) should deem best.2 2  In 1874 the Administration of
Justice Act 3 provided for Courts of Assize and Nisi Prius to be held
without commissions and that any judge or Queen's Counsel presiding
at any court of Assize, Nisi Prius, Oyer and Terminer and General
Gaol Delivery should have all the powers which he would have had
under commissions under the former practice.
It may be said that since the act of i856 we have not had in
Ontario commissions for trial courts, except special commissions of
Oyer and Terminer, etc., the power to issue which is still continued
and has been exercised.
When in i881, the two common-law courts and the court of
chancery were united in one court, the Supreme Court of judicature
for Ontario, 24 there was an express provision for commissions of
Assize, etc., issuing by proper authority, but the existing condition
was not interfered with that the ordinary trial courts should be held
with or without a commission as the Governor (i. e., the Ministry)
should deem best. At the present time the days upon which such
courts are to begin their sittings, and the judge who is to preside
over each, are fixed by the judges of the High Court Division of the
Supreme Court and no commission issued. But no power was ever
given to a judge presiding at a trial court to grant a new trial: when
the Courts of Queen's (King's) Bench and Common Pleas were
separate and distinct courts, the application for a new trial must be
made in term to the court from which process issued. When by the
Judicature Act of 1881 the courts were amalgamated, there was still
18 Vic. Ch. 92, sec. 43 (Can.).
By 12 Vic. Ch. 63 (Can.) in 1849.
19 & 2o Vic. Ch. 43, secs. 152, 153 (Can.).
' The legislation is continued and slightly amended in 1857, 20 Vic. Ch. 57, sec.
30; i859, C. S. U. C. Ch. 1I, secs. 1, 2, 3; 1866, 29 & 30 Vic. Ch. 40, sec. 3;
all statutes of the province of Canada-after Confederation the Province of
Ontario passed (1873) Ch. 8, sec. 52 (Ont).
(1874) 37 Vic. Cl. 7 (Ont).
'4By The Ontario Judicature Act of i881, 44 Vic. Ch. 5 (Ont).
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as in England a division into divisional courts corresponding to the
former separate courts; and for a time the application must be made
to the divisional court of the division to which the action was
instituted.25 Such was the case where an action was tried by a jury:
if the action was tried by a judge without a jury, the application was
to the Court of Appeal. Later amendments permitted the application
even in cases tried without a jury to be made to the divisional court
if desired.28  When actions ceased to be assigned to any division 7 and
all writs were styled simply "In the High Court of Justice," the
motion for a new trial was heard by any divisional court or the Court
of Appeal.
All divisional courts of the High Court were abolished by an act28
coming into force January ist, 1913, and now all applications for a
new trial must be made to the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of Ontario, corresponding to the former Court of Appeal. It
should be said that by rule in Ontario, as in some other provinces, the
trial judge may grant a new trial where a party does not appear and
judgment has gone against him.
It is not necessary to trace the history of the practice of new trial
in the other Provinces; in none of them has the trial judge any power
in that regard and the application must be made to the "court above."
' Before the Judicature Act of I88i, common-law actions were begun by writs
which were issued from the two common-law courts alternately (in order to
equalize the work of the two courts, each of which had the same jurisdiction,
practice, etc.) : proceedings in chancery were begun by bill of complaint The
Judicature Act abolished the bill of complaint and directed that all actions (now
including suits) should begin by writ of summons, but that the writ should
be styled in one or other division-Queen's Bench Division, Common Pleas
Division or Chancery Division, secs. 23, 25. Writs in the Queen's Bench and
Common Pleas Division were to be issued alternately, R. 21. The action was
accordingly styled in some division and application for a new trial was made
to the divisional court (generally of three but sometimes only two judges) of
that division, R. 3o7. The application was by way of order nisi corresponding
to the former rule nisi-in the Court of Appeal, a simple notice .was given.
"When the rules were amended in i888 (in force March ist, i888) it was
directed that writs should issue alternately from the Queen's Bench, Chancery
and Common Pleas Divisions (R. 226) ; and that after a trial by a judge without
a jury, the application for a new trial might be made either to the divisional
court or the Court of Appeal.
By rules coming into force September Ist, 1897: R. 127, Forms I, 2, 3.
The statute 3 & 4 Geo. V, Ch. ig--The Judicature Act-brought into force
January ist, 1913, by proclamation. This forms one superior court, the Supreme
Court of Ontario, with two divisions, the Appellate Division and the High Court
Division-the latter being the trial division. I may add that while there has
never been any express prohibition against the trial judge sitting in a court
upon an application for a new trial in a case tried before him, it has never
been done since the abolition of the practice of issuing writs out of a particular
division.
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IN UPPER CANADA (ONTAIO)--CRIMINAL CASES
In Upper Canada the English practice was followed: there was no
new trial in felonies, nor in misdemeanors in cases of acquittal except
in certain quasi-civil cases. 29 In 1851 an act was passed
° which
enabled the trial judge in case of a conviction to reserve a case for
the consideration of either common-law court, but it was held that
this did not empower the court to grant a new trial.3
1
In 1857,-2 Parliament enacted that a person convicted of a crime
might
"apply for a new trial upon any point of law or question of fact in
as ample a manner as any person may apply to the Superior Courts
of Common Law for a new trial in a civil action" and "if the con-
viction be affirmed the person convicted may appeal to the Court of
Error and Appeal."
If the conviction was in the Quarter Sessions, the application for a
new trial must be made to that court and if the appeal should fail, a
further appeal lay to a court of common law. In 1869,3 all power
was taken away from every court to gran~t a new trial. Thereafter
the convicted person must rely upon a case reserved for one of the
common-law courts; the appeal from the common-law courts to the
Court of Error and Appeal was also taken away.
When the Criminal Code was enacted in 1892,
84 power was given
on the refusal of the trial judge to reserve a case for the convict (with-
the leave of the attorney general given in writing) to move the Court
of Appeal for such a case: when a reserved case should come before
the Court of Appeal, that court might order a new trial or make such
order as it should deem proper. If the judges of the Court of Appeal
were unanimous, their decision was to be final; if not, an appeal might
be taken to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Some changes have been made in the practice: at the present time
the "Court of Appeal" is in Ontario the Appellate Division of the
I mention only Upper Canada, but the English criminal law was in force
in Lower Canada from 1763; and the laws of the two provinces in criminal
matters have always been practically the same.
so 14 & I5 Vic. Ch. 13 (Can.) passed by the Parliament of United Canada-the
two Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada became one Province of Canada by
the Union Act of 1840, 3 & 4 Vic. Ch. 35 (Imp.) coming into effect February xoth,
1841, and so continued until the formation of the Dominion of Canada by The
British North America Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Vic. Ch. 3 (Imp.) coming into
effect July ist, 1867.
' 1Reg. v. Baby (1854) 12 U. C. Q. B. 346: the act was much like the English
Act of 1848 referred to above which'also was held not to enable a new trial
to be granted.
n20 Vic..Ch. 6r, secs. I, 2, 4 (Can.): Cf. C. S. U. C. Ch. I13, secs. 1, 3, 6, 7.
'By 32 & 33 Vic. Ch. 29, see. 8o (Dom.).
(1892) 55 & 56 Vic. Ch. 29 (Dom.), The Criminal Code of 1892.
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Supreme Court of Ontario, and a convict may move without the leave
of the attorney general; if he moves on the ground of weight of
evidence, however, he must obtain the leave of the trial judge.3 5
IN THE UNITED STATES
The common law of England became the common law of the United
States as it had been the common law of the thirteen colonies: while
there is no report of any decision in the colonies before the Revolution
granting a new trial, there is no doubt that the courts of general
jurisdiction exercised the power of granting new trials in proper
cases.
The Nisi Prius system was not in vogue and the trial judge (at
least in most cases) sat as the court and not as a mere commissioner;
and he it was to whom the application for a new trial was made.
In Massachusetts the Nisi Prius system was adopted in 1803-4 with
the necessary consequence: 8 but in most cases the trial judge was
always "the court."
In some of the states the losing party could have a new trial as
of right by merely claiming an appeal as in Massachusetts, 7 Con-
necticut 8 and some other states.
I R. S. Can. i9o6, Ch. 146, The Criminal Code, secs. 1013, 1014 (proceedings in
error prohibited), 1O15, ioi6, io8, 1i0g, i02i, 1024. Sec. 1o22 gives power to the
minister of justice to order a new trial if he "entertains a doubt whether such
person ought to have been convicted." This power has been exercised once
and (I think) only once. Practice in criminal cases, like criminal law in general,
being by The British North America Act (the written constitution of Canada)
entrusted to the Dominion, criminal practice is now uniform throughout the
Dominion.
See Miller v. Baker (1838, Mass.) 20 Pick. 285, 288, per Shaw, C. 3., deliver-
ing the judgment of the court.
See U. S. v. 1363 Bags of Merchandise (1863, U. S. D. C. Mass.) 2 Sprague,
85, 86 (25 MONTHLY LAv RrP. 6oo), per Sprague, 3., who-adds:
"If the second verdict was the same as the first, it was conclusive unless the
court, in its discretion, should see fit to set it aside. If the result of the second
trial was different from that of the first, the losing party had a right, by a
process of review, to have another trial. The losing party in the third trial,
having had two verdicts against him, was concluded thereby, unless the court
should grant him a new trial. By this system it was not thought safe to rely
upon the finding of a single jury. A party could claim a re-trial as matter of
right until two verdicts had gone against him, and even then the court had the
power to grant another trial if in their discretion they should deem it proper.
This system commenced at an early period, and was in operation for a long
time. It continued for some years after Maine became a separate State. I had
then some agency in bringing about a change."
"0 fortunatos nimium sua si bona norint advocati."
'Bartholomew v. Clark (1816) 1 Conn. 472, 473, per N. Smith (arguendo)
. . which was granted of course to the unsuccessful party, until there had
been two verdicts the same way." The reporter, Thomas Day, adds a note:
"This practice still exists, to a certain degree, in some of the New-England
states." It certainly did exist in Massachusetts, as Maine did not become a
separate state till 182o,--and we have seen that the practice was in vogue in
Massachusetts at that time.
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But the rule in granting new trials became much the same as in
England in respect of grounds for such a proceeding. At the present
time in practically every state of the Union, the trial judge has power
to grant a new trialV9 New Jersey is an exception: there the practice
is to apply to the trial judge for a rule to show cause why the verdict
should not be set aside and a new trial ordered (the common-law rule
nisi) ; the rule is then argued before the full court (the trial judge
being a member) in term. This is substantially the common-law
system, except that in New Jersey it is the trial judge and not the
court en banc who grants the rule to show cause.
In most of the states it is considered that the power of the trial
judge to grant a new trial is purely statutory: but in some it is con-
sidered that the right is "inherent in the trial court" (Alabama), that
the right is a common-law right (Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota), but regulated and modified by statute (Missouri, New York,
North Carolina, Wisconsin). Connecticut thinks it an affirmance of
the common law; Indiana can trace her statutory power back to
1852; Maine derived her jurisprudence from Massachusetts but now
it seems to be wholly statutory. 0
The decision of the trial judge is final in Delaware, Maine and
New Mexico; where a new trial is granted there is no appeal in
California (though the order is reviewable on an appeal from the
judgment), Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri (in
criminal cases); in North Carolina an appeal from the trial judge's
decision is allowed only when a new trial is granted on the ground
of error committed in the trial, while in South Carolina the supreme
court cannot review the facts and can grant a new trial only where a
question of law is involved on which the trial judge has made an
erroneous finding.
In the other states named in note 39, there is an -appeal from the
decision of the trial judge.
I have not considered the case of inferior courts.7 in all instances
any power they possess to grant a new trial is statutory; nor have I
considered the venire de novo employed where the verdict was defec-
tive, etc.--in some states, e. g., Indiana, that is considered not affected
by legislation.
" I have to thank the chief justices of the following states for their ready
and courteous answers to my enquiries: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
I have not made an independent examination but have contented myself with
the information these eminent gentlemen have given me either expressly or by
reference to authority.
" See Averill v. Rooney (1871) 59 Me. 58o, Laws of x872, Ch. 83: R. S. (i9o3)
Ch. 84, sec. 54.
